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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is considered as a key mechanism for explaining the evolution
of cooperation in situations where the same individuals interact only a few times.
Under indirect reciprocity, an individual who helps others gets returns indirectly
from others who know her good reputation. Recently, many studies have discussed
the effect of reputation criteria based only on the former actions of the others (first-
order information) and of those based also on the former actions of opponents of the
others (second-order information) on the evolution of indirect reciprocity. In this
study, we investigate the evolutionary stability of the indirectly reciprocal strategy
(discriminating strategy: DIS), which cooperates only with opponents who have
good reputations, in the n(> 2)-person case where more than two persons take
part in a single group (interaction). We show that in the n-person case, DIS is
an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) even under the image-scoring reputation
criterion, which is based only on first-order information and where cooperations
(defections) are judged to be good (bad). This result is in contrast to that of the
two-person case where DIS is not an ESS under reputation criteria based on first-
order information and where evolutionary stability of DIS requires both first- and
second-order information.
Key words: ESS, indirect reciprocity, image scoring, reputation, prisoner’s
dilemma
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1 Introduction
Indirect reciprocity is considered to be a key mechanism for explaining the
evolution of cooperation in situations where the same individuals interact
only a few times and where the reputations of individuals affects the decision-
making process (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Under indirect
reciprocity, an individual who helps others gets returns indirectly from others
who know her good reputation in the community.
Nowak & Sigmund (1998a,b) formalized a mathematical model of indirect
reciprocity as an evolutionary two-person giving game involving image scor-
ing that evaluates the reputations of individuals in a community. In their
model, pairs of individuals interact only a few times and all individuals are
informed about their partners’ reputations (image score), which reflects the
partners’ past behaviors. They showed that, in this model, an indirectly re-
ciprocal strategy, called discriminating strategy (DIS), which cooperates only
with opponents who have good reputations, can prevail in the population.
Since the seminal works by Nowak & Sigmund, many theoretical and exper-
imental studies on indirect reciprocity have been conducted (e.g. Leimar &
Hammerstein, 2001; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Lotem et al., 1999; Milin-
ski et al., 2001, 2002b; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003, 2004; Fishman, 2003;
Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004,
2005; Takahashi & Mashima, 2006).
One of the most important issues regarding the studies of indirect reciprocity
has been how people judge (define) others’ goodness (e.g. Leimar & Ham-
merstein, 2001; Milinski et al., 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki &
Iwasa, 2004, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Takahashi
& Mashima, 2006). Put more precisely, a controversial issue in indirect reci-
procity is whether people use only first-order information, which are the former
actions of the others, or use in addition second-order information, which are
the former actions of opponents of the others. Using second-order informa-
tion, each individual can distinguish between defections to former defectors
and those to former cooperators. In other words, second-order information
enables us to distinguish between justified and unjustified defections. (The
image scoring given in Nowak & Sigmund (1998a,b) is a reputation criterion
based on first-order information, i.e., others’ past behavior.)
Many theoretical studies (e.g. Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan
& Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004), us-
ing the two-person game, have pointed out that, under image scoring that is
based on first-order information, the indirectly reciprocal strategy, DIS, is
not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The reason that DIS is not an
ESS is as follows: DIS strategists hurt each other in response to error de-
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fections because a DIS strategist does not cooperate with individuals who
defected out of error, causing her own reputation to become bad. As a re-
sult, DIS strategists defect against each other. On the contrary, individuals
who adopt an unconditionally cooperative strategy called ALLC always in-
tend to cooperate. Therefore ALLC strategists do not hurt others and are not
hurt by DIS strategists. Consequently, in a population consisting of DIS,
the fitness of DIS is less than ALLC, so the DIS population can be invaded
by ALLC. On the other hand, several studies (e.g. Leimar & Hammerstein,
2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Takahashi &
Mashima, 2006) have stated that DIS is an ESS under a reputation criterion
that reflects not only first-order information but also second-order informa-
tion. Especially, Panchanathan & Boyd (2003) showed that, in the presence of
implementation error, DIS is an ESS under standing reputation criterion un-
der which an individual’s defections to former defectors are justified (Sugden,
1986). Moreover, Ohtsuki & Iwasa (2004, 2005) showed that, in the presence
of implementation error and objective perception error, under the eight rep-
utation criteria called the leading eight, which include standing, under which
an individual’s defections to former defectors is justified, a strategy forming
a cooperative society is an ESS. Furthermore, Takahashi & Mashima (2006)
showed that, in the presence of subjective perception error, DIS is an ESS
under the reputation criteria under which an individual’s cooperations with
former defectors is unjustified 1 .
Note that most of the above studies on indirect reciprocity have presumed
dyadic interaction. However, in the real world, more than two persons often
take part in a single group (interaction). The evolutionary stability of DIS,
which cooperates only when all the opponents in the group have good reputa-
tions, was investigated for groups of various sizes in Suzuki & Akiyama (sub-
mitted) 2 . They showed that in a population with DIS, ALLC, and ALLD
(unconditionally defective strategy), DIS is an ESS not only under standing,
which reflects second-order information, but also under image scoring, which
reflects only first-order information, if the group size is more than two and if
the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is sufficiently small.
In this study, we analyze the evolutionary stability ofDIS under image scoring
in the situation where more than two persons take part in a single group and
where the population consists of all the possible strategies that decide their
own action based on the number of opponents in the group whose reputation
1 However, experimental studies have not been able to conclude whether people
actually use only first-order information or also use second-order information. For
instance, Milinski et al. (2001) found that people do not actually use second-order
information, while Bolton et al. (2005) found that they do.
2 Furthermore Suzuki & Akiyama (2005) used agent-based computer simulation to
investigate the evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes. However
they did not mention the evolutionary stability.
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is good. Clearly, in the absence of error, DIS is not an ESS because ALLC is
an alternative best reply to DIS. Therefore, in this study, we focus on the case
with implementation error. First, we investigate the evolutionary stability of
DIS analytically, and next, compare the result with that derived by numerical
calculation.
2 Indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes
Consider a population composed of an infinite number of individuals. Each
individual in the population has her own reputation either G (good) or B
(bad).
Each generation comprises a number of rounds. After the first round, each
of the subsequent rounds occurs with probability w (0 ¿ w < 1), i.e., the
expected value of the number of rounds in a generation is 1/(1 − w). At the
beginning of each generation, the reputation of each individual is G.
In each round, all individuals are divided randomly into groups, each of which
comprises n(≥ 3) individuals, and play an n-person prisoner’s dilemma game
in each group. In this game, each of the individuals chooses either to “co-
operate (C)” or “defect (D)”. The payoffs for a cooperator, V (C | k), and
that for a defector, V (D | k), where k is the number of opponents cooperating
in the group, satisfy the following conditions (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1988;
Molander, 1992; Eriksson & Lindgren, 2005):
• Each individual is better off choosing D regardless of the choices of the other
members in the group (dominance of D):
V (D | k) > V (C | k). (1)
• The payoff for each individual increases as the number of cooperators in-
creases (monotonicity):
V (D | k) > V (D | k − 1), V (C | k) > V (C | k − 1). (2)
• The average payoff of individuals in the group increases with the number of
cooperators (efficiency of cooperation):
(k + 1)V (C | k) + (n− k − 1)V (D | k + 1) >
kV (C | k − 1) + (n− k)V (D | k). (3)
In this paper, we assume that the payoff functions for cooperators and defec-
tors are, as in Joshi (1987); Eriksson & Lindgren (2005); Lindgren & Johansson
(2001), etc., calculated as a linear combination of the payoffs against the n−1
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opponents in two-person prisoner’s dilemma games whose payoff is given in
Table 1:
V (C | k)=
bk
n− 1
− c (4)
V (D | k)=
bk
n− 1
, (5)
where b > c > 0 and we have divided the leaner combination of the payoffs
by n − 1 in order to compare results from different group sizes. Of course,
these payoff functions satisfy the conditions (1)-(3). In this game, b represents
the benefit of cooperation to the recipients and c denotes the cost to the
donor. Note that this game is a straightforward expansion of the two-person
giving game used in many studies regarding indirect reciprocity (e.g. Nowak
& Sigmund, 1998a,b; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003). In the case of n = 2, the
payoff functions (4)-(5) are the same as those in Nowak & Sigmund (1998a,b);
Panchanathan & Boyd (2003).
Table 1
Payoff of two-person prisoner’s dilemma game (b > c > 0).
Player 2
cooperation defection
Player 1 cooperation (b− c, b− c) (−c, b)
defection (b, −c) (0, 0)
Moreover, implementation error is introduced by the parameter ² (0 < ²¿ 1).
With a probability ², an individual who intends to cooperate fails to cooperate
due to a lack of resources or a mistake 3 . In other words, an individual who
intends to cooperate succeeds in cooperation with a probability ²ˆ = 1 − ²
(0¿ ²ˆ < 1). In this study, we mainly use the probability of the success, ²ˆ.
2.1 Reputation criterion
In this model, the reputation of opponents affects the decision-making pro-
cess. How is the reputation assigned to each individual? In this study, we adopt
“image scoring” as a reputation criterion, which prescribes how to judge the
3 We, as in Panchanathan & Boyd (2003); Fishman (2003); Brandt & Sigmund
(2004), do not consider errors that cause unintentional cooperation, i.e., an individ-
ual who intends to defect never fails to defect. Furthermore, perception error (Oht-
suki & Iwasa, 2004; Takahashi & Mashima, 2006) is not included.
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reputation of others on the basis of the others’ past action. Under the cri-
terion, which was first used in Nowak & Sigmund (1998a,b), the reputation
of an individual who has defected becomes B and that of an individual who
has cooperated becomes G. This is a simple reputation criterion that requires
only the past action of opponents (first-order information) (cf., standing rep-
utation criterion given in Leimar & Hammerstein (2001); Panchanathan &
Boyd (2003) uses second-order information).
2.2 Strategies
In this study, individuals are supposed to use a strategy that prescribes how
to decide their own action based on their opponents’ reputations.
Such a strategy is represented by a vector p = (p0, · · · , pn−1), where pi ∈ {0, 1},
in which pi represents an action of the individual when the number of oppo-
nents who have reputation G is i, and 0 and 1 mean defection and cooperation,
respectively. For example, in the four-person case, a p = (0, 1, 0, 0) strategist
cooperates only when one opponent has reputation G, and a p = (0, 0, 1, 1)
strategist cooperates only when more than one opponents have reputation G.
In other words, there are 2n different strategies.
3 Evolutionary stability of indirect reciprocity (analytical investi-
gation)
Here we discuss the evolutionary stability of pˆ = (0, ..., 0, 1), which is called
discriminating strategy (DIS).
For this purpose, we consider the situation where a small number of p strate-
gist enter a population dominated by pˆ strategists and where the frequency
of the invader is sufficiently small for us to presume that each individual al-
ways interacts only with incumbent pˆ strategists. In the rest of this paper, we
always consider this situation.
Let W (p|pˆ) be the fitness in this situation. In this section, we demonstrate
the inequality
W (pˆ|pˆ)>W (p|pˆ) (for all p 6= pˆ). (6)
If the inequality holds, pˆ is an ESS.
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3.1 Frequency of individuals with reputation G
With gˆt, we represent the frequency of individuals with reputation G among
incumbent pˆ strategists, and with gt, that among invader p strategists. Under
image scoring, only the individuals who have cooperated at round t− 1 have
reputation G at round t. In other words, to derive the frequency of individuals
with reputation G, it is necessary to derive the probability that each individual
cooperates.
The possible situations that each individual faces are the following n cases:
there is no opponent with G reputation; there is one; · · · ; and there are n− 1
opponents with G reputation. Since we are considering the case where each
individual always interacts with only incumbent pˆ strategists, the probability
that an individual belongs to a group with i opponents who have reputation
G is represented as n−1Cigˆ
i
t
(1− gˆt)
n−1−i. Therefore, the probability that each
individual faces each of the above n situations at round t is represented as an
n-dimensional vector,
s(t)= (s0(t), · · · , sn−1(t))
=
(
(1− gˆt)
n−1, · · · ,n−1 Cigˆ
i
t
(1− gˆt)
n−1−i, · · · , gˆn−1
t
)
. (7)
Using s(t), we represent the probability that an incumbent pˆ strategist coop-
erates at round t as ²ˆpˆ · s(t), and the probability that an invader p strategist
cooperates at round t as ²ˆp · s(t).
Consequently, the frequency of individuals with reputation G among incum-
bent pˆ strategists at round t is
gˆt =


1 if t = 1
²ˆpˆ · s(t− 1) if t ≥ 2.
(8)
Since pˆ = (0, · · · , 0, 1), gˆt = ²ˆgˆ
n−1
t−1 for t ≥ 2. Considering 0 ¿ ²ˆ < 1, clearly
lim
t→∞
gˆt = gˆ∞ = 0.
Likewise, the frequency of individuals with reputation G among invader p
strategists at round t is
gt =


1 if t = 1
²ˆp · s(t− 1) if t ≥ 2.
(9)
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Considering gˆ∞ = 0 and eq. (9), g∞ is ²ˆp0 where p0 is the first component of
p.
3.2 Expected payoff at round t
Here we derive the expected payoff at round t for incumbent pˆ strategists and
for invader p strategists.
Recall that the payoff for an individual is determined by the probability that
the focal individual cooperates and by the probability that an opponent of the
focal individual cooperates (see eqs. (4) and (5)). Therefore, in order to derive
the expected payoff at round t for incumbent pˆ strategists, we need to get
the probability that an incumbent pˆ strategist cooperates and the probability
that an opponent of the focal pˆ strategist cooperates at round t. Note that the
opponent always has pˆ strategy since we consider the situation where each in-
dividual always interacts with only incumbent pˆ strategists. As we mentioned
above, both the probabilities are ²ˆpˆ · s(t). Consequently, the expected payoff
at round t for incumbent pˆ strategists is
W(t)(pˆ|pˆ)= ²ˆbpˆ · s(t)− ²ˆcpˆ · s(t) = ²ˆpˆ · s(t)(b− c). (10)
Next, we derive the expected payoff at round t for invader p strategists. For
this purpose, we need to get the probabilities that an invader p strategist
cooperates at round t and that an opponent of the focal invader p strategist
cooperates at round t. The probability that an invader p strategist cooperates
at round t is ²ˆp · s(t). Moreover, we consider the probability that an opponent
of the focal invader p strategist cooperates at round t. The probability that
an opponent of the focal p strategist faces a situation where no opponent has
reputation G is (1−gt)(1− gˆt)
n−2 and the probability that she faces a situation
where all the n− 1 opponents have reputation G is gtgˆ
n−2
t . Furthermore, the
probability that she faces a situation where i (0 < i < n− 1) opponents have
reputation G is
(1− gt)n−2Cigˆ
i
t
(1− gˆt)
n−2−i + gt ·n−2 Ci−1gˆ
i−1
t
(1− gˆt)
n−1−i. (11)
Note that in this study, we consider the case for n ≥ 3. The first-term in-
dicates the case in which the focal p strategist in the group has reputation
B and the second-term indicates the case in which the focal p strategist in
the group has reputation G. Therefore the probability that, at round t, an
opponent of the focal invader p strategist faces each of the n situations—
there is no opponent with G reputation; there is one; · · · ; and there are
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n − 1 opponents with G reputation—is represented as an n-dimensional vec-
tor s′(t) = (s′0(t), · · · , s
′
n−1(t)),
s′(t)=
(
(1− gt)(1− gˆt)
n−2,
(1− gt)(n− 2)gˆt(1− gˆt)
n−3 + gt(1− gˆt)
n−2,
· · · ,
(1− gt)n−2Cigˆ
i
t
(1− gˆt)
n−2−i + gt ·n−2 Ci−1gˆ
i−1
t
(1− gˆt)
n−1−i,
· · · ,
(1− gt)gˆ
n−2
t
+ gt(n− 2)gˆ
n−3
t
(1− gˆt),
gtgˆ
n−2
t
)
. (12)
Therefore, the probability that an opponent of the focal invader p strategist
cooperates at round t is ²ˆpˆ ·s′(t). Note that an opponent of the focal invader p
strategist always has pˆ strategy. Consequently, the expected payoff at round
t for invader p strategists is
W(t)(p|pˆ)= ²ˆbpˆ · s
′(t)− ²ˆcp · s(t) = ²ˆ
(
bpˆ · s′(t)− cp · s(t)
)
. (13)
In the next section, using eqs. (10) and (13), we will derive the fitness for two
types of individuals.
3.3 Fitness for incumbent pˆ strategists and for invader p strategists
We define the fitness for incumbent pˆ strategists,W (pˆ|pˆ), and that for invader
p strategists, W (p|pˆ), as the expected value of the total payoff received by
the two types of individuals, respectively, during a generation. Assuming that
W(t)(pˆ|pˆ) and W(t)(p|pˆ) (t ≥ 3) are approximately the same as in the limit of
round t→∞, W(∞)(pˆ|pˆ) and W(∞)(p|pˆ), W (pˆ|pˆ) and W (p|pˆ) are
W (pˆ|pˆ)=W(1)(pˆ|pˆ) + w ·W(2)(pˆ|pˆ) +
w2
1− w
W(∞)(pˆ|pˆ), (14)
W (p|pˆ)=W(1)(p|pˆ) + w ·W(2)(p|pˆ) +
w2
1− w
W(∞)(p|pˆ). (15)
3.4 Evolutionary stability of pˆ
Here we show that the inequality W (pˆ|pˆ) > W (p|pˆ) holds for all p 6= pˆ.
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3.4.1 Evolutionary stability of pˆ against invasion by p with pn−1 = 1
For this purpose, we first show that W (pˆ|pˆ) > W (p|pˆ) for all p (6= pˆ) with
pn−1 = 1, hereafter called p
C = (pC0 , · · · , p
C
n−2, 1).
Substituting eq. (10) into eq. (14), the fitness for incumbent pˆ strategists is
W (pˆ|pˆ)= ²ˆ(b− c) + w²ˆpˆ · s(2)(b− c) +
w2
1− w
²ˆpˆ · s(∞)(b− c)
= ²ˆ(b− c) + w²ˆpˆ · s(2)(b− c). (16)
Note that since gˆ(∞) = 0, pˆ · s(∞) = 0.
On the other hand, substituting eq. (13) into eq. (15), the fitness for invader
pC strategists is
W (pC |pˆ)= ²ˆ(b− c) + w²ˆ[bpˆ · s′(2)− cpC · s(2)]
+
w2
1− w
²ˆ[bpˆ · s′(∞)− cpC · s(∞)]
= ²ˆ(b− c) + w²ˆ[bp · s′(2)− cpC · s(2)]−
w2
1− w
²ˆcpC0 . (17)
Note that since we are considering the case for n ≥ 3, s′
n−1(∞) = 0 and so
pˆ ·s′(∞) = 0. Furthermore, s(∞) = (1, 0, · · · , 0) because gˆ(∞) = 0. Therefore,
pC · s(∞) = pC0 .
Since both types of individuals intend to cooperate at the first round, gˆ2 = g2,
s(2) = s′(2). Considering s(2) = s′(2), the difference between the fitness for pˆ
and pC strategists is
W (pˆ|pˆ)−W (pC |pˆ)=w²ˆcs(2) · (pC − pˆ) +
w2
1− w
²ˆcpC0 . (18)
The difference (eq. (18)) is 0 if and only if pC = pˆ, i.e., pC = (0, · · · , 0, 1);
otherwise the difference is positive 4 . Consequently,
W (pˆ|pˆ)>W (pC |pˆ) (for all pC 6= pˆ), (19)
where pC is a strategy p with pn−1 = 1.
4 Note that since all the components of s(2) are positive and those of pC − pˆ are
non-negative, these two vectors are not orthogonal.
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3.4.2 Evolutionary stability of pˆ against invasion by p with pn−1 = 0
Next, we show that the condition that the inequalityW (pˆ|pˆ) > W (p|pˆ) holds
for all p with pn−1 = 0, hereafter called p
D = (pD0 , · · · , p
D
n−2, 0). To show this,
we first show that the fitness for the p0 = (0, · · · , 0) strategy which is one of
the pD strategies, is the largest among the fitness for the pD strategies, i.e.,
W (p0|pˆ) > W (pD|pˆ) for all pD 6= p0.
Substituting eq. (13) into eq. (15), the fitness for invader p0 strategists is
W (p0|pˆ)= ²ˆb. (20)
Note that since p0 strategists never cooperate and so gt = 0 for t ≥ 2, incum-
bent pˆ strategists never cooperate with them.
On the other hand, by pD
n−1 = 0 and eq. (9), the frequency of individuals
with reputation G among pD strategists is as follows: g2 = 0 and g(∞) =
²ˆpD0 . Therefore, substituting eq. (13) into eq. (15), the fitness for invader p
D
strategists is
W (pD|pˆ)= ²ˆb− w²ˆcpD · s(2)−
w2
1− w
²ˆcpD · s(∞)
= ²ˆb− w²ˆcpD · s(2)−
w2
1− w
²ˆcpD0 . (21)
Note that s(∞) = (1, 0, · · · , 0).
The difference between the fitness for invader p0 and pD strategists is
W (p0|pˆ)−W (pD|pˆ)=w²ˆcpD · s(2) +
w2
1− w
²ˆcpD0 . (22)
Since si(2) > 0 for all i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), the difference (eq. (22)) is 0 if and
only if pD = p0, i.e., pD = (0, · · · , 0); otherwise the difference is positive 5 .
Therefore, W (p0|pˆ) > W (pD|pˆ) for all pD 6= p0.
Hence, W (pˆ|pˆ) > W (pD|pˆ) for all pD if and only if W (pˆ|pˆ) > W (p0|pˆ).
Comparing eq. (20) with eq. (16), we find that the condition for W (pˆ|pˆ) >
W (p0|pˆ) is
W (pˆ|pˆ)>W (p0|pˆ)
5 Note that since all the components of s(2) are positive and those of pD are non-
negative, these two vectors are not orthogonal.
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Fig. 1. Regions in (n, c/b) space, where pˆ is an ESS, given analytically with the
approximation (²ˆ = 0.95 and w = 0.95). Region I: pˆ can not resist invasion by pD.
Region II: pˆ is an ESS.
²ˆ(b− c) + w²ˆn(b− c)> ²ˆb
c/b<
w²ˆn−1
1 + w²ˆn−1
. (23)
Therefore, W (pˆ|pˆ) > W (pD|pˆ) for all pD if and only if c/b < w²ˆn−1/(1 +
w²ˆn−1).
3.4.3 Evolutionary stability of pˆ against invasion by all the p strategists
We have shown that W (pˆ|pˆ) > W (p|pˆ) for all p (6= pˆ) with pn−1 = 1 and
thatW (pˆ|pˆ) > W (p|pˆ) for all p with pn−1 = 0 if and only if c/b < w²ˆ
n−1/(1+
w²ˆn−1).
Consequently,
W (pˆ|pˆ)>W (p|pˆ) (for all p 6= pˆ), (24)
if and only if c/b < w²ˆn−1/(1 + w²ˆn−1). In other words, under image scoring,
the strategy pˆ is an ESS if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is suffi-
ciently small. The condition of the cost-to-benefit ratio is illustrated in Fig. 1.
As shown in the figure, the condition becomes more restrictive as group size
increases, but not so drastically.
12
 1
 0.9
 0.8
 0.7
 0.6
 0.5
 0.4
 0.3
 0.2
 0.1
 0
 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 3
c/
b
Group Size, n
I
II
III
Fig. 2. Regions in (n, c/b) space, where pˆ is an ESS, given numerically without the
approximation (²ˆ = 0.95 and w = 0.95). Region I: pˆ can not resist invasion by pD.
Region II: pˆ is an ESS. Region III: pˆ can not resist invasion by pC .
4 Evolutionary stability of indirect reciprocity (numerical investi-
gation)
So far, we have investigated the evolutionary stability of the indirectly recipro-
cal strategy pˆ analytically with the approximation given in eqs (14)-(15). Here,
we investigate the evolutionary stability using numerical calculation without
the approximation.
We illustrate the result of the numerical calculation in Fig. 2. As shown in
the figure, between small and large cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, there
exist a range of the medium ratio where the indirectly reciprocal strategy pˆ
is an ESS. If the cost-to-benefit ratio is large, pˆ can not resist invasion by pD,
and, if the ratio is extremely small, pˆ can not resist invasion by pC . Under
the medium cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, pˆ is an ESS. In other words,
the conclusion of the analyses that pˆ can be an ESS under image scoring in
n(> 2)-person game does not change whether the approximation is used or
not.
Furthermore, comparing Fig. 2 with Fig. 1, we find that the approximation
given in eqs (14)-(15), which makes possible the analytical investigation in
the previous section, is valid especially for large group size. The validity of the
approximation for large group is crucial for the investigation of evolutionary
stability, because, for large group size, we have to check the stability of pˆ
against a huge number of strategies in order to investigate the evolutionary
stability of pˆ and it requires huge computational time. For instance, if group
size, n = 20, we have to check the stability against about million strategies.
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5 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the evolutionary stability of indirectly recipro-
cal strategy, DIS (pˆ strategy) which cooperates only when all the opponents
in the group have good reputations, under image scoring. Under image scor-
ing which reflects only first-order-information, cooperations (defections) are
judged to be good (bad) unconditionally. In particular, we have focused on
the n (> 2) person case where n persons take part in a single group, and on the
case where there is implementation error. The analysis has shown that, in the
n-person case, DIS can be an ESS even under image scoring, which reflects
only first-order information, whereas DIS can never be an ESS in the two-
person case (e.g. Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Brandt
& Sigmund, 2004; Takahashi & Mashima, 2006). In other words, in the n (> 2)
person case, first-order information is sufficient for indirect reciprocity to be
maintained stably.
Specifically, in the n (> 2) person case, DIS is an ESS among all the possi-
ble strategies that decide their own action based on the number of opponents
whose reputation is good, within a range of the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooper-
ation, even under image scoring. If the cost-to-benefit ratio is large, DIS can
not resist invasion by defective strategies and, if the ratio is extremely small,
DIS can not resist invasion by cooperative strategies. Under the medium cost-
to-benefit ratio of cooperation, DIS is an ESS. Moreover, the condition for
DIS to be an ESS becomes more restrictive as group size, n, increases, but
not so drastically. However, it is important to note that image scoring in the n
(> 2) person case does not satisfy Ohtsuki & Iwasa’s criterion for the leading
eight (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004) under which a strategy that attains high level
cooperation is an ESS, because DIS cannot attain high level cooperation un-
der image scoring in the presence of error. Under image scoring, the frequency
of individuals who have good reputation decreases over time in response to
error defections, and so they come not to cooperate with each other.
The difference in the evolutionary stability of DIS under image scoring be-
tween the two-person case and the n (> 2) person case is attributed to the
ability to resist invasion byALLC. Consider the situation in whichDIS strate-
gists are incumbent and a few ALLC strategists invade the population. In the
two-person case, a DIS strategist does not cooperate with individuals who
defected because of error, so her reputation gets worse. As a result, DIS
strategists hurt each other. On the contrary, an ALLC strategist is not drawn
into the chain of retaliative defections because she always intends to cooperate,
and thus her reputation does not get worse. Therefore, the fitness of ALLC
exceeds that of DIS and so DIS cannot resist invasion by ALLC. On the
other hand, in the n (> 2) person case, an invader ALLC strategist mostly
belongs to a group with two or more incumbent DIS strategists. In this group,
14
the DIS strategists defect in response to another DIS strategist’s bad rep-
utation. That is, an invader ALLC strategist cannot avoid being drawn into
the chain of retaliative defections in the n (> 2) person case. Therefore, the
fitness of ALLC is less than that of DIS because ALLC strategists intend to
cooperate even in the chain of the retaliative defections, and so DIS strate-
gists can resist invasion by ALLC. Consequently, DIS is an ESS under image
scoring in the n (> 2) person case, whereas DIS is not in the two-person case.
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